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THE COURT GIvETH, AND CONGRESS TAKETH
AWAY:
STATUTORY PREEMPTION AND THE FEDERAL
COMMON LAW D'OENCH DocTRINE
MICHAEL B. KENT, JR.
This article examines the continued validity of the federal common law
component of the D'Oench powers after the OMelveny and Atherton deci-
sions, concluding that by enacting Section 1823(e), Congress has preempt-
ed the D'Oench rule and the courts should no longer treat D'Oench as good
law.
INTRODUCTIONThe late 1980's saw the largest bank failures in the history of the
United States.' In 1984, the nation suffered "the greatest bank run
in history" when Continental Illinois National Bank collapsed.2 The
total bailout of Continental Illinois cost around $15 million, $4 million of
which came from the federal government.3 Additionally, nearly one-third
of the Savings and Loan institutions in existence in 1980 failed or reached
insolvency by the early 1990's, resulting in costs to the American taxpayer
estimated at $500 billion.4 Due to fears that the federal government's bank
insurance fund would soon run out of money as a result of bailing out the
failed institutions,5 the Bush administration, in 1991, requested that
Congress increase the borrowing authority of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation ("FDIC" or "Corporation"), the entity which man-
1 Richard M. Salsman, Bankers as Scapegoats for Government-Created Banking Crises in U.S. History, in The
Crisis in American Banking 81, 107 (Lawrence H. White ed., 1993).
2 BenjaminJ. Keblaner, American Commercial Banking 232 (1990).
3Id.
Id.
5 The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation did run out of money due to the thrift failures of
the 1980's. Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency Law Now That It Matters Again, 42 Duke L. J. 469, 480 (1992).
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ages the fund, to $70 billion.6 Currently, because the FDIC seems to be in
dire financial straits itself, some observers fear the Corporation may not be
closing banks which are economically insolvent, eventually resulting in
more bailouts at taxpayer expense.7
The FDIC acts as the federal government's primary agent in dealing
with failed financial institutions." The Corporation insures monies deposit-
ed in member institutions and acts as receiver when these institutions fail.9
When a bank or other institution becomes insolvent, the FDIC, as receiv-
er, has the duty of sorting out the bank's assets and liabilities. o In col-
lecting assets or paying off liabilities, the Corporation often encounters
agreements between the failed banks and third parties that have no docu-
mentation in the records of the institution. These agreements sometimes
have great significance for the receivership process, by either forming a
defense by which debtors may relieve themselves from paying their oblig-
ations or providing the basis for an action to collect damages from the
Corporation.,, Obviously, such undocumented agreements could poten-
tially cost the FDIC enormous sums of money by preventing the collection
of outstanding debts owed to the bank or by requiring the Corporation to
pay damages for the fraudulent actions of the failed institution. Increased
costs to the FDIC result in increased costs to taxpayers.
The Corporation's primary tools in limiting such costs are the D'Oench
powers,12 a set of federal common law and statutory rules designed to pre-
vent claims and defenses based on undocumented agreements from being
raised against the FDIC. 13The heart of the D'Oench powers, the 1942
D'Oencb Supreme Court decision, initially sought to protect the FDIC from
6 Lawrence H. White, Why Is the US. Banking Industry In Trouble? Business Cycles, Loan Losses, and
Deposit Insurance, in The Crisis In American Banking 7, 9 (Lawrence H. White ed., 1993).
Id. at 11.
8 See Swire, supra note 5, at 481 (explaining that FDIC is now exclusive receiver for both banks and thrifts).
9 See 12 U.S.C. 5 1821(d) (1994) (outlining the powers and duties of the FDIC).
to Id.
" See Fred Galves, Might Does Not Make Right. The Call for Reform of the Federal Government's D'Oench,
Dubme and 12 US.C § 1823(e) Superpowers in Failed Bank Litigation, 80 Minn. L. Rev. 1323, 1341 (1996)
("Such claims and defenses usually are based on either (1) alleged verbal side agreements or special
arrangements the borrower made with the institution, or (2) the borrower's alleged reliance on negligent
or intentional verbal misrepresentations made by the institution.").
12 The D Oench powers are named after the 1942 Supreme Court case creating the federal common law
rule that forms the basis of the powers: D Oench, Dubme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942). See infra
notes 32-56 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and holding of the D'Oench decision).
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collusive agreements, fraudulent misrepresentations, or other hidden trans-
actions that tended to mislead the Corporation." The Court in that case
prohibited the maker of a note acquired by the FDIC from raising, as a
defense to payment, a secret agreement intended to deceive a bank exam-
iner about the actual assets of the failed bank., The purpose of the rule
was to prevent the FDIC from relying on inaccurate records, 6 thereby pro-
tecting the public funds administered by the Corporation. Eight years after
the D'Oench decision, Congress enacted 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) to accomplish
the same purpose.,,
Because both the statute and the common law doctrine address
the same issue and accomplish the same purpose, the statute should act as
the source of authority regarding that issue. In the years since the Court
fashioned its common law rule, however, that rule has not only been relied
on but has also been broadened by the federal courts. Moreover, despite
the apparent codification of the common law rule in FIRREA8, the courts
continue to push the common law rule to apply in contexts where the stat-
ue would not. 9 By prohibiting all claims and defenses based on agree-
13 Galves, supra note 11, at 1327-28. The statutory component of the D'Oencb powers reads, in relevant
part, as follows:
"(e) Agreements against interests of Corporation
(1) In general
No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the interest of the Corporation in any asset acquired by it under this
section or section 1821 of this title , either as security for a loan or by purchase or as receiver of any insured deposi-
tory institution, shall be valid against the Corporation unless such agreement-
(A) is in writing,
(B) was executed by the depository institution and any person claiming an adverse interest thereunder, including
the obligor, contemporaneously with the acquisition of the asset by the depository institution,
(C) was approved by the board of directors of the depository institution or its loan committee, which approval shall
be reflected in the minutes of said board or comminttee, and
(D) has been, continuously, from the time of its execution, an official record of the depository institution."
12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1)(1994). The statute was first enacted in 1950 as part of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act, ch. 967, 64 Stat. 873, 889 (1950)(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1)(1994)). The statute was made a part
of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) by Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103
Stat. 183 (1989). FIRREA also provided that "any agreement which does not meet the requirements set
forth in section 1823(e) of this title shall not form the basis of, or substantially comprise, a claim against
the Corporation." 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(9)(A) (1994).
14 D'Oench, Dubne & Co., 315 U.S. at 460.
15 Id.
t6 See id. ("The test is whether the note was designed to deceive the creditors or the public authority or
would tend to have that effect. It would be sufficient in this type case that the maker lent himself to a
scheme or arrangement whereby the banking authority on which respondent relied in insuring the bank
was or was likely to be misled.")
t7 See Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 91-92 (1987) (identifying the purposes of the statute).
t8 While most commentators refer to S 1823(e) as a codification of the rule established in the D Oench case,
many courts consider the statute to be a separate and distinct line of authority. See, e.g., Motorcity of
Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 120 F.3d 1140, 1143 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that Congress did
not intend FIRREA to displace D'Oencb doctrine); Young v. FDIC, 103 F.3d 1180, 1187 (4th Cir. 1997) ("[Tihe
common-law doctrine and the statute remain separate and independent grounds for decision.").
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ments not documented in bank records, the D'Oencb doctrine places the
FDIC in a more advantageous position than the banks it takes over.20
Although the purpose of protecting the FDIC against misleading records,
and thereby reducing the costs to taxpayers, remains fully in tact through
§ 1823(e), the courts have consistently broadened the Corporation's pro-
tection through the common law rule at the expense of innocent borrow-
ers.
Recent developments suggest, however, that the judicial utilization and
expansion of the D'Oench doctrine may be at an end. The Supreme Court
has recently handed down a pair of decisions that call the continued valid-
ity of D'Oencb into question.2 1 Some lower courts, relying on these prece-
dents, accordingly have held that the common law prong of the doctrine
has been displaced by congressional action.2 2  Other courts, however,
maintain that D'Oench has not been preempted.23 The resolution to the
preemption question will vitally impact the FDIC's rights and powers in
relation to failed banks and their borrowers. If the federal common law
no longer forms valid authority, the FDIC could face a loss in its funds as
certain claims and defenses not allowed under D'Oench suddenly become
valid because they are not barred by the specific text of 5 1823(e).
This Article examines the continued validity of the federal common
law component of the D'Oench powers after the O'Melveny and Atherton
decisions, concluding that by enacting 5 1823(e), Congress has preempted
the D'Oench rule and the courts should no longer treat D'Oench as good
law. Part II.A discusses the background of the D'Oench decision, paying
special attention to the original case, the federal common law issues sur-
rounding it, and the judicial expansion of the common law rule. Part II.B
19 See Young, 103 F.3d at 1187 (observing that D Oench doctrine "now applies virtually to all cases where
the FDIC is confronted with an agreement not documented in the institution's records."). Sen. William S.
Cohen remarked that the D'Oench doctrine was invoked in 5,145 instances between 1989 and 1995, result-
ing in the dismissal of ninety-seven percent of the claims filed against the FDIC. 7be D Oench, Dubme
Reform Act: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 2
(1995)(statement of Sen. William S. Cohen).
20 See Ira Blumberg, Borrower Prepare: D'Oench Maps the Escape from the Dungeon of Dubme, 14 Ann.
Rev. Banking L 269 (1995)("In particular, when a bank fails, the FDIC can collect money from the bank's
borrowers even when the bank itself would have been powerless to collect.").
21 Atherton v. FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 666 (1997); OMelveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994).
22 Eg., DiVall Insured Income Fund Ltd. Partnership v. Boatmen's First Nat'l Bank, 69 F.3d 1398, 1402-03
(8th Cir. 1995)(holding that the "comprehensive regulatory framework of FIRREA" preempts the federal
common law DOench doctrine); Murphy v. FDIC, 61 F3d 34, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1995)(holding same).
23 Motorcity ofJacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, NA., 120 F.3d 1140, 1143 (11th Cir. 1997); Young V.
FDIC, 103 F.3d 1180, 1187 (4th Cir. 1997).
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describes § 1823(e) and addresses the ways in which D'Oench influenced
the statutory rule, as well as the different ways in which the statute and the
common law are applied. Part III.A explores the propriety of federal com-
mon law in the area of bank regulation, focusing on the Supreme Court's
guidelines for determining when a statute preempts an existing common
law rule and reviewing the Court's decisions in O'Melveny and Atherton.
Part III.B provides a discussion of the current circuit split concerning the
statutory preemption of D'Oench. Part IV analyzes the D'Oencb doctrine
in light of the Supreme Court's statutory preemption guidelines and recent
case law relating to bank regulation, arguing that FIRREA preempts the
common law rule and that the courts should cease using the D'Oench deci-
sion as authority.
BACKGROUND
The D'Oench rules have existed in some form or another for more than
half a century, and in that time the rights and powers of the FDIC under
those rules have greatly expanded. What initially amounted to an equi-
table doctrine designed to keep the Corporation's funds intact2 4 eventually
turned into a powerful two-pronged weapon utilized by the FDIC to shift
its costs to innocent borrowers.25 Because the common law prong of the
D'Oench rules provides a broader and more flexible tool through which
the Corporation can protect itself,26 its continued vitality will prove crucial
to the FDIC in subsequent failed bank litigation. If the common law doc-
trine is determined to be preempted by FIRREA, as this article proposes it
should be, the FDIC's so-called "superpowers"2 7 would no longer appear
quite as super since the Corporation would find itself forced to deal exclu-
sively within the confines of the statutory text.
To understand the importance of the statutory preemption issue, the
history of the D'Oench rules must be examined. Thus, this Part reviews
24 D'Oench, Dubme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 457 (1942).
25 See In reNBW Commercial Paper Litig., 826 F. Supp. 1448, 1467 (D.D.C. 1992) ("D Oench determines, as
between two 'innocents' (the FDIC and the 'wronged' bank customer), who should bear the cost of the
failed bank's wrongs. If the customer bears the slightest blame-by failing to protect himself by getting
an agreement in writing-the scale tips in favor of the FDIC and D Oench bars the claim or defense.").
26 See infra notes 124-131 and accompanying text (exploring differences between federal common law
D'Oench doctrine and analogous statutory provisions of FIRREA).
27 See Swire, supra note 5, at 483 (referring to D Oench rules as "superpowers").
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the Supreme Court decision from which the D'Oencb rules grew, includ-
ing the policies underlying the Court's decision as well as the federal com-
mon law issues presented by that case. This Part also examines the judi-
cial expansion of the common law doctrine in recent years. Finally, this
Part presents an overview of § 1823(e) and § 1821(d)(9), exploring the pur-
pose of these statutory provisions and explaining the differences between
these provisions and the federal common law rule.
Overview of DiLench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC
The principal component of the D'Oench doctrine remains the Supreme
Court's 1942 decision in D'Oench, Dubme & Co. v. FDIC28 Despite the fact
that § 1823(e) has existed for over forty years and seemingly codifies the
D'Oench rule,29 the FDIC and several courts consider the statute and the
common law rule to provide independent grounds for decision.so
Furthermore, the common law doctrine "providels] the FDIC with broader
protections in certain instances." 31 To fully understand the scope of the
D'Oench rules, as well as why § 1823(e) preempts the common law rule,
one must understand the factual situation and policies underlying the
Court's decision in D'Oench.
Facts and Holding. The Supreme Court created the common law
component of the D'Oench powers in D'Oench, Dubme & Co. v. FDIC,32
decided only eight years after the statutory birth of the Corporation.33
D'Oench, Dubme & Co. (D'Oench, Dubme), a St. Louis securities dealer, in
1926 sold a number of bonds to Belleville Bank & Trust Co. (Belleville), a
bank located in Belleville, Illinois.34 For some reason, unexplained by the
28 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
29 See supra note 13 and accompanying text (providing actual text and legislative history of S 1823(e)).
30 See supra note 18 (citing court decisions that treat the statute and common law doctrine independently);
see also Statement of Policy Regarding Federal Common Law and Statutory Provisions Protecting FDIC, as
Receiver or Corporate Liquidator, Against Unrecorded Agreements or Arrangements of a Depository
Institution Prior to Receivership, 62 Fed. Reg. 5984 (1997) ("The strict approval and recording requirements
of section 1823(e) supplemented the protection afforded by the D'Oench doctrine.")(emphasis added).
3' DiVall Insured Income Fund Ltd. Partnership v. Boatmen's First Nat'1 Bank, 69 F.3d 1398, 1401 (8th Cir.
1995).
32 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
1 The FDIC was created as part of the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 168 (1933), which added sec-
tion 12B to the Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1811-1831a).
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Court in its decision, the bonds later went into default." D'Oench, Dubme
then executed promissory notes covering the amount of the defaulted
bonds and gave them to Belleville so that no past due bonds would appear
on the bank's records.36 D'Oench, Duhme had no intention of paying off
the notes, however, and reached an agreement with the bank that no col-
lection would be attempted.7
In 1933, D'Oench, Duhme executed another note renewing those orig-
inally provided to Belleville.38 The FDIC, which insured the bank in 1934,
acquired the renewal note when Belleville failed a few years later.39 The
Corporation attempted to collect payment on the note, and when D'Oench,
Duhme refused to pay, the FDIC filed suit.40
In answering the FDIC's complaint, D'Oench, Duhme argued that the
FDIC was not a holder in due course because the renewal note lacked con-
sideration and because of the understanding between D'Oench, Duhme
and Belleville that the note would not be paid."' The district court held
D'Oench, Duhme liable on the note under Illinois law.', The Eighth Circuit
affirmed, applying general law to determine that, since the note was an
Illinois contract, Illinois law governed the dispute. 3 The Court of Appeals
held that under Illinois law, the FDIC was the equivalent of a holder in due
course and as such, was entitled to payment."
SD'Oench, Dubme & Co., 315 U.S. at 454.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. The receipts for the notes included the following statement: This note is given with the under-
standing it will not be called for payment. All interest payments to be repaid. Id.
3 Id.
39 Id. The acquisition of the note by the FDIC was part of the process for resolving Belleville's failure.
Such a process usually includes three primary steps: (1) the bank's regulator appoints a receiver who man-
ages the bank's operations; (2) the receiver attempts to collect the fair market value of the bank's assets;
and (3) the receiver makes certain the bank's liabilities are satisfied. Michael D. Floyd, Could D Oench Be
Doomed? The Impact of OMelveny & Myers v. FDIC, 15 Ann. Rev. Banking L 325, 329 (1996). Although
the FDIC typically acts as receiver for failed inancial institutions, the Corporation did not act as receiver
for Belleville. Rather, the FDIC arranged for another bank to assume Belleville's deposit liabilities, and
acquired the note as part of this transaction. D'Oench, Dubme & Co., 315 U.S. at 454. Such an arrange-
ment-where one bank takes over another-is referred to as a "purchase and assumption" transaction. 1
Milton R. Schroeder, The Law and Regulation of Financial institutions & 12.02(2) (1995).
40 D'Oench, Dubme & Co., 315 U.S. at 453-54.
i Id. at 456.
42 Id. at 455.
43 Id.
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The primary issue for consideration before the Supreme Court con-
cerned which body of law actually applied to the case. 5 D'Oench, Duhme
maintained that, since the suit was filed in a federal district court located
in Missouri, that court should have applied Missouri's conflict of laws rules
under existing precedent. 6 The Court held, however, that it did not need
to decide whether Missouri or Illinois law applied because federal law gov-
erned the case.,
Because no federal statute provided a substantive rule with which to
determine whether D'Oench, Duhme had to pay, the Court fashioned a
common law rule based on its earlier decision in Deitrick v. Greaney. 4 8
Deitrick concerned a promissory note provided to a bank by its cocon-
spirator for the purpose of concealing the bank's acquisition of 190 shares
of its own stock in criminal violation of the National Banking Act. 9 As in
D'Oench, the bank in Deitrick eventually failed, and its receiver sought to
collect on the note.50 The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that the note lacked consideration, holding that the defendant could
not rely on his own criminal conduct to prevent payment. 1 Critical to the
Court's decision in Deitrick was the existence of a federal statute:
[T]he doctrine with which we are now concerned...is a principle
which derives its force from the circumstance that respondent's
act, apart from its possible injurious consequences to creditors, is
4 Id.
44 Id. Under the law of commercial paper, a holder in due course generally takes a negotiable instrument
free of defenses. See U.C.C. 5 3-302 (1995) (stating that a holder in due course takes "without notice that
any party has a defense or claim in recoupment").
1 D'Oench, Dubme & Co., 315 U.S. at 455.
46 Id. D'Oench, Dubme argued that Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electnc Manufacturing Co, 313 U.S. 487 (1941),
controlled the choice of law issue. Klaxon held that, in a diversity action, a federal court must apply the
conflict of laws rules of the state in which the court sits. Id. The Court noted that federal jurisdiction in
this case did not depend on diversity of citizenship because the FDIC brought the action under authority
of a federal statute allowing the Corporation to sue or be sued in federal court. D Oench, Dubme & Co.,
315 U.S. at 455.
4 D'Oench, Dubme & Co., 315 U.S. at 456.
' Id. (citing Deitrick, 309 U.S. 190 (1940)).
9 Deitnck, 309 U.S. at 192; see 12 U.S.C. 5 83 (1994) (prohibiting a bank from, inter alia, purchasing or
holding shares of its own stock).
5o Deitrick, 309 U.S. at 192.
5' Id. at 198.
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itself a violation of the statute; and that the statute read in the light
of its purposes and policy, precludes resort to the very acts which
it condemns, as the means of thwarting those purposes by visiting
on the receiver and creditors...the burden of the bank's unlawful
purchase.52
In D'Oench, the Court expanded its rule in Deitrick by barring
D'Oench, Duhme's defense even though its conduct violated no federal
statute.53 Noting that D'Oench, Duhme executed the renewal note before
Congress created the FDIC, and therefore could not have intended to
deceive the Corporation,54 the majority nonetheless found the secret agree-
ment between D'Oench, Duhme and Belleville contrary to a federal poli-
cy of protecting the FDIC against misrepresentations.5 The test, according
to the Court, was whether an undocumented agreement existed to deceive
the creditors or the public authority or would tend to have that effect.56
The Court obviously wanted to protect the relatively new Corporation, as
well as American taxpayers, from the unscrupulous actions of banking offi-
cials and other interested parties in banking transactions. Since no statute
afforded that protection in the instant case, the Court formed its own rule
to implement the policy it thought Congress intended.
Policies Behind the Court's Decision. The test set forth by the
Supreme Court in D'Oench was obviously designed to further a legitimate
policy goal-protecting the FDIC against fraudulent or misleading bank
records to aid the Corporation in resolving bank failures.57 Looking to sec-
tion 12B(s) of the Federal Reserve Act,58 the Court observed that the statute
provided criminal sanctions for anyone who knowingly or willfully misled
the FDIC.9 The Court also noted that the statute, at the time the
52 Id.
5 See DOMencb, Dubme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 458 (1942) ([Tihe reach of the rule which prevents an
accommodation maker of a note from setting up the defense of no consideration against a bank or its
receivers or creditors is not delimited to those instances where he has committed a statutory offense.).
14 Id. at 459.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 460.
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Corporation initially insured Belleville, required certification of solvency by
a state banking authority and examination by the FDIC before a bank was
eligible for insurance.60 The majority read the statute as evincing a con-
gressional intent to safeguard the Corporation: "These provisions reveal a
federal policy to protect [the FDIC] and the public funds which it adminis-
ters against misrepresentations as to the securities or other assets in the
portfolios of the banks which [the Corporation] insures or to which it
makes loans."61 By prohibiting defenses based on secret agreements from
being raised against the Corporation, the Court helped ensure that the
FDIC could perform its obligations without undue surprise caused by a
bank's hidden liabilities.62
The economic and political tenor of the previous decade bolstered the
Court's interpretation of legislative intent. Congress created the FDIC to
help the banking industry, and the country as a whole, recover from the
brutal effects of the Great Depression. 63 The economic crisis hit the bank-
ing community hard. One-third of the nation's banks failed during the
banking crisis," and 398 banks, with total deposit liabilities of about $500
million, closed between 1934 and 1940.65 The effect of the banking indus-
try's deterioration was devastating to the American economy, as one com-
5 A recent opinion by the Eleventh Circuit described the purpose of D'Oench quite well:
D'Oench, Dubme and its progeny enable the FDIC, and banks that acquire insolvent banks' assets from
the FDIC, to make quick and accurate appraisals of the value of insolvent banks' assets by protecting the
FDIC and its transferees against undisclosed agreements that would unexpectedly diminish the value of
those assets.
First Union Nat'l Bank v. Hall, 123 F.3d 1374, 1379 (11th Cir. 1997). Note, however, that the original rule
articulated by the Supreme Court applied only to the FDIC, not its transferees or assignees. The Eleventh
Circuit's description, then, provides a subtle example of how the doctrine has been expanded over the
years. See infra notes 84-130 and accompanying text (exploring the judicial expansion of the D'Oencb doc-
trine).
58 Section 12B was withdrawn from the Federal Reserve Act by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, ch. 967,
64 Stat. 873 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 5 1811-1831a (1994)).
59 D'Oench, Duhme & Co., 315 U.S. at 456-57. The Court referred specifically to a portion of the statute
which established a fine of up to $5,000 and/or a prison term of not more than one year for attempting to
defraud the FDIC. The statute, then 12 U.S.C. 5 264(s), is now a part of the criminal code and codified at
18 U.S.C. § 1007 (1994).
6 D'Oench, Dubine & Co., 315 U.S. at 457. The Court here referred to then 12 U.S.C. 5 264 (y). The pro-
visions of subsection (y) were dropped from the statute by amendment in 1935. Id. at 457 n.3.
61 Id.
62 See id. ("The genuineness of assets ostensibly held by a bank is certainly germane to a determination of
solvency.")
63 See Helen M. Burns, The American Banking Community and the New Deal Banking Reforms
1933-1935 77-93 (1974) (describing events underlying passage of Banking Act of 1933); see also D'Oench,
Dubme & Co., 315 U.S. at 472 (stating that FDIC was "created and financed ... to bolster the entire banking
and credit structure.") (Jackson, J., concurring).
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mentator has explained: "The economic impact of the banking collapse
was profoundly damaging, as the money supply and income fell by a third,
business investment plummeted, and unemployment reached 25%."6 In
light of the economic environment which fostered the creation of the FDIC,
the Court naturally sought to give the Corporation a tool with which to
protect itself from having to pay more than expected.67
The political climate surrounding the FDIC's creation similarly provid-
ed support for the Court's opinion. Testimony before the Senate subcom-
mittee investigating the banking crisis revealed malpractice on the part of
many of the country's bankers, and several members of Congress sought
to reform the industry by strengthening federal control over the banking
systemr? Part of the plan to enhance the federal government's role in bank
regulation was a deposit insurance structure.69 Not surprisingly, the bank-
ing community opposed strict federal control and dubbed deposit insur-
ance unsound and unfair.70 Despite this opposition, strong public support
for federal deposit insurance helped make the FDIC a reality." In sum, the
Court, looking at the moral tone set by the congressional hearings as well
as the public's interest in deposit insurance, would undoubtedly have had
little trouble concluding that the Corporation needed protection against
fraud in the banking industry, and the D'Oench decision was designed to
afford just such protection by barring D'Oench, Duhme's defense.72
Federal Common Law Issues. The Court no doubt found support
for its decision in the economic and political situations surrounding the
64 Salsman, supra note 1, at 97.
65 Keblaner, supra note 2, at 171.
6 Salsman, supra note t, at 97.
67 See Richard E. Flint, Why D'Oench, Duhme? An Economic, Legal and Philosophical Cntique of a Failed
Bank Policy, 26 Val. U. L Rev. 465, 487-88 (1992):
[Tihe continued economic health of the insurance fund was viewed as a necessary and sufficient condition
to prevent further financial reversals in the banking industry. In a nutshell, D'Oench was an integral piece
of the failed bank policy puzzle. The decision enhanced the underlying economic value of the policy by
preserving the insurance fund and thus, allegedly supporting the goal of monetary stability.
6 See Burns, supra note 63, at 78-80 (discussing Senate hearings, proposed constitutional amendments,
and so-called Glass banking bill), see also Salsman, supra note 1, at 98-101 (maintaining that both Congress
and President Roosevelt villainized banking community and blamed bankers for nation's economic hard-
ship).
69 See Burns, supra note 63, at 85-86 (discussing proposed creation of the FDIC).
,o Id. at 86.
7i Id. at 89.
72 D Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 461 (1942).
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FDIC's creation by Congress. The Court faced an obstacle, however, in
that Congress had failed to directly address the issue before the Court.
Because the case involved a federal question, federal law governed the dis-
pute.7 3 Because no federal statute directly addressed the problem present-
ed by the case, the Court looked to federal common law to provide the
rule of decision.71
Such a determination necessarily implicated Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins,75 where the Supreme Court held that "[there is no federal gen-
eral common law."'7 Although Erie can be read to prohibit the federal
courts from ever creating common law rules, subsequent decisions showed
that federal common law remained proper after Erie, provided that the fed-
eral common law rule touched a subject within national legislative power.77
Thus, Erie did not wipe away federal common law. The Court in Erie sim-
ply demanded that, to fashion a common law rule, a federal court show
that it has authority to do so.78
The majority opinion in D'Oench did not specifically address the ori-
gin of its authority to fashion a federal common law rule, stating only that
the case involved decision of a federal question.79 Justice Jackson's con-
curring opinion, however, outlined the source of the Court's lawmaking
power 5  After observing the absence of a governing federal statute, Justice
Jackson explained the impact of Erie in cases like the one at hand:
1 Id. at 455-56.
7 Id.
7 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
7 Id. at 78. While Erie is best known for mandating that federal courts sitting in diversity look to state law
for rules of decision, the opinion concerns the lawmaking power of the federal courts as well. See George
D. Brown, Federal Common Law and the Role of the Federal Courts in Private Law Adjudication-A (ew)
Erie Problem?, 12 Pace L. Rev. 229, 237-45 (1992) (discussing Erie's importance for lawmaking ability of
federal judiciary); Michael Wells, Positivism and Antipositivism in Federal Courts Law, 29 Ga. L. Rev. 655,
665-66 (1995) ("Instead of treating Erie as a rule forbidding the development of federal common law ...
the Court immediately began to build such a body of decisions.").
' See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943) (finding that federal law governs
rights and duties of United States on commercial paper it issues). In discussing its authority to fashion a
federal common law rule, the Clearfield Court stated: "The authority to issue the check had its origin in
the Constitution and the statutes of the United States.... In absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is
for federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards." Id. See also
Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie - And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L Rev. 383, 405
(1964) ("The clarion yet careful pronouncement of Erie, 'There is no federal general common law,' opened
the way to what, for want of a better term, we may call specialized federal common law.").
7 See id. at 79 ("[Llaw in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite
authority behind it.") (quoting Black & White Taxi Cab Co. v. Brown & Yellow 7?axi Cab Co., 276 U.S. 518,
533 (1928) (Holmes, J. dissenting)).
D Oench, Dubme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 456 (1942).
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The federal courts have no general common law, as in a sense
they have no general or comprehensive jurisprudence of any kind,
because many subjects of private law which bulk large in the tra-
ditional common law are ordinarily within the province of the
states and not the federal government. But this is not to say that
wherever we have occasion to decide a federal question which
cannot be answered from federal statutes alone we may not resort
to all of the source materials of the common law or that when we
have fashioned an answer it does not become a part of the feder-
al non-statutory or common law.... [Federal law] is found in the
federal Constitution, statutes, or common law. Federal common
law implements the federal Constitution and statutes, and is con-
ditioned by them.,,
In short, Justice Jackson understood that the Court possessed the
power to fashion its rule in D'Oench because Congress, although autho-
rizing the action as one arising under the laws of the United States, neglect-
ed to statutorily provide an adequate rule with which to decide the con-
troversy."' Because no federal statute defined the rights of the Corporation
as holder of the note in question, the Court had the authority "to apply the
traditional common-law technique of decision and to draw upon all
sources of the common law"83 to define such rights.
Expansion of the Common Law Rule. In defining the rights of the
FDIC as holder of the note, the Court prohibited D'Oench, Duhme from
raising a defense founded on a "secret agreement" that either was designed
to deceive the regulators or was likely to have that effect.84 The Court fash-
8 Justice Jackson's opinion is generally considered one of the better judicial efforts to justify federal com-
mon law. See, e g., McGurl v. Trucking Employees of NorthJersey Welfare Fund, Inc., No. 96-5348, 1997
WL 522857, at *10 (3d. Cir. Aug. 22, 1997) (referring to Justice Jackson's "famous" concurrence in D'Oench);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and The Federal System 753
(4th ed. 1996) (calling Justice Jackson's opinion "illuminating").
" Id. at 469, 472 (Jackson, J., concurring).
82 Id. at 468 (Jackson, J., concurring).
83 Id. at 472 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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ioned its rule to protect the Corporation,85 but principles of equity addi-
tionally seemed to guide the Court's decision. Although the majority
allowed for the application of the rule regardless of the subjective intent of
the parties involved,86 it implied that factors such as business sophistica-
tion87 and culpable conducts, may be considered. In short, the common
law doctrine found its roots in the concept of equitable estoppel."9
Unfortunately, the doctrine has grown beyond its equitable origins and
is now applied to bar claims or defenses based on undocumented agree-
ments regardless of the innocence, culpability, or sophistication of the par-
ties. 0 Moreover, since its inception over half a century ago, the D'Oench
common law rule has seen enormous expansion as the federal courts have
applied it to almost every situation in which the FDIC intervenes in the
affairs of insolvent institutions.91  As one court stated in defining the
D'Oench doctrine:
In a suit over the enforcement of an agreement originally execut-
ed between an insured depository institution and a private party,
8 Id. at 460.
85 Id. at 461-62.
6 See id. at 460 ("It would be sufficient in this type of case that the maker lent himself to a scheme or
arrangement whereby the banking authority on which respondent relied in insuring the bank was or was
likely to be misled."); W. Robert Gray, Limitations on the FDIC's D'Oench Doctrine ofFederal Common Law
Estoppel: Congressional Preemption and Authoritative Statutory Constmction, 31 S. Tex. L. Rev. 245, 250
(1990) (arguing that "Justice Douglas evidently examined only the effect of the debtor's actions rather than
its agent's purpose or state of mind in imposing the estoppel.").
87 Despite the opinion's emphasis on objective conditions, the Court indicated the rule would apply where
the maker lent himself to a scheme likely to mislead the FDIC "in this t4pe of case." D Oench, Dubme &
Co., 315 U.S. at 460 (emphasis added). The case before the Court in D Oench involved sophisticated busi-
nesses who knew the laws and regulations of the banking industry. While the Court certainly provided
for the rule to be applied objectively, its reference to "this type of case" at least allows the interpretation
that the doctrine was also to be applied equitably. Had different parties been before the Court, perhaps
the rule would never have been created. After all, D'Oench, Duhme and Belleville were among those
social pariahs blamed for the Great Depression-a securities firm and a bank. See supra notes 58-71 and
accompanying text (describing economic and political forces of Great Depression).
4 The Court repeatedly referred to the fact that D'Oench, Dubme had engaged in questionable behavior
and could not use such conduct as a defense against paying the note. See, e.g., id. at 454 (noting that
D'Oench, Duhme's president knew notes had been executed to keep defaulted bonds from appearing as
liabilities in Belleville's records); id. at 460 ('[Olne who gives such a note to a bank with a secret agree-
ment that it will not be enforced must be presumed to know that it will conceal the truth from the vigilant
eyes of the bank examiner.").
89 El du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FDIC, 32 F.2d 592, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
9 See Galves, supra note 11, at 1375-78 (listing twenty-eight affirmative claims and defenses prohibited by
the D'Oench doctrine and/or S 1823(e)).
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a private party may not enforce against a federal deposit insurer
any obligation not specifically memorialized in a written document
such that the agency would be aware of the obligation when con-
ducting an examination of the institution's records.92
Thus, the doctrine now covers claims as well as defenses,93 torts as well as
contracts, 4 and the Corporation's assignees as well as the FDIC itself.95
Accordingly, most claims and defenses that could be raised in litigation
against the insolvent institution become invalid once the institution fails.
In its desire to protect the FDIC, the federal bench has, based on the
reasoning of D'Oench, developed a conceptually distinct yet related feder-
al common law rule known as the federal holder-in-due-course ("HDC")
doctrine. 6 The federal HDC doctrine, like D'Oencb, "gives the FDIC the
power to collect money owed to failed banks in situations where the bank
itself could not have collected the money. "97 Under the federal HDC doc-
trine, the FDIC has a complete defense to state and common law fraud
claims "on a note acquired by the FDIC in the execution of a purchase and
assumption transaction, for value, in good faith, and without actual knowl-
edge of the fraud at the time the FDIC entered into the purchase and
assumption agreement."98
91 For a concise look at the scope of the D'Oench doctrine, as well as 5 1823(e) and the federal holder-in-
due-course doctrine, see Fred Galves, FDIC and RTC Special Powers in Failed Bank Litigation, 26 Colo.
Law. 473 (1993).
92 Baumann v. Savers Federal Say. & Loan Assoc., 934 F.2d 1506, 1515 (11th Cir. 1991).
1 See Young v. FDIC, 103 F.3d 1180, 1187-88 (4th Cir. 1997) (prohibiting, under the D'Oench doctrine, plain-
tiffs wrongful death, unfair trade practice, and fraud claims).
9 See RTC v. Dunmar, 43 F.3d 587, 594 (11th Cir. 1995) ("WIhere ... a tort claim arises in the course of reg-
ular banking transactions, such that exclusion of the alleged 'secret agreement' accords with the underly-
ing policies of D'Oench set forth in Langley, that claim is barred.") The Eleventh Circuit referred to Langley
v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 91-92 (1987). It is worth mentioning here that in Langley, the Supreme Court express-
ly addressed the policies underlying 5 1823(e), not the policies underlying D'Oench. Id.
9 Kilpatrick v. Riddle, 907 F.2d 1523, 1528 (5th Cir. 1990). The D'Oench doctrine likewise applied to the
FSLIC and its successors-in-interest before Congress eliminated the FSLIC by statute. See Aewton v. Uniwest
Financial Corp., 967 F.2d 340, 347 (9th Cir. 1992) (extending D'Oench to FSLIC's successor-in-interest);
FSLIC v. Gemini Management Corp., 921 F.2d 241, 245-46 (9th Cir. 1990) (considering purpose of DOench
doctrine and concluding doctrine applies in case where FSLIC acted as receiver and debtor relied on
unrecorded, unwritten agreement).
96 Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 872 n. 14 (11th Cir. 1982). Although, the federal HDC doctrine
remains a separate rule, at least one commentator considers it a component of the D'Oench rules. Floyd,
supra note 39, at 330. The federal HDC doctrine is mentioned here as an example of how the federal
courts have used the reasoning of D'Oench to broaden the FDIC's powers rather than adhering to the text
of 5 1823(e).
97 Floyd, supra note 39, at 339.
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The Sixth Circuit's opinion in FDIC v. Wood- illustrates well how the
federal HDC doctrine, although technically distinct from the D'Oench rule,
expands the rights of the Corporation as holder of assets acquired from
failed banks and thereby affords the FDIC a D'Oench-like weapon. The
issue before the court in Wood concerned whether the FDIC could recov-
er the full amount of interest (at an annual percentage rate of 15.21%)
payable on a note made out for $12,000 when a jury found the rate usuri-
ous under state law.1on The Michigan usury statute did not apply to an
HDC,101 but the court noted that § 1823(e) does not confer HDC status on
the FDIC.10 2 Therefore, the court followed the rule in Gunter, declaring the
Corporation an HDC as a matter of federal common law.o"
The court apparently wanted to afford the Corporation as much pro-
tection as possible, and since that protection could not be found in the text
of the statute, the court, as in D'Oench, resorted to federal common law.
The difference between Wood and D'Oench, however, is that in the latter,
Congress had not yet spoken to the FDIC's rights as holder whereas in the
former, it had. Therefore, the application of a D'Oench-like common law
rule enabling the Corporation to collect, even though the failed bank could
not, lacked legitimacy under Justice Jackson's concurrence in D'Oench.'
Overview of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) and 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(9)
In his D'Oench concurrence, Justice Jackson made clear that the Court
had authority to create a federal common law rule because Congress had
failed to address the specific issue before the Court-whether the FDIC
I Gunter, 674 F.2d at 873.
9 758 F.2d 156 (6th Cir. 1985).
'" Id. at 157. According to Michigan law, a party could generally not agree to an interest rate above 7%.
Id. at 158 (citing Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 438.31 (West 1978)).
101 Id.
102 Id. at 159-61.
103 Id. The court presumably did not extend the DOench rule itself to bar the usury defense because the
interest rate, written on the face of the note itself, did not qualify as a secret agreement. See id. at 157
(explaining terms of note). At least one other court had so extended D'Oench prior to this decision. FDIC
v.JuliusRichman, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 114, 118 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), affd on other grounds, 666 F.2d 780, 782 (2d
Cir. 1981). In a decision subsequent to Wood, however, the Sixth Circuit implied that D'Oench could not
be extended to bar a usury defense. FDIC v. Leach, 772 F.2d 1262, 1266 (6th Cir. 1985).
104 See D'Oencb, Dubme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 469 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) (explaining that
federal courts may create federal common law when there exists "occasion to decide a federal question
which cannot be answered from federal statutes alone").
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could collect on the note despite the undocumented agreement that the
note was not to be paid.lol In 1950, however, Congress did address the
enforceability of undocumented agreements in litigation against the FDIC
by enacting 12 U.S.C. 5 1823(e).'o6 The statute has remained relatively
unchanged since that time, and today exists as part of the FIRREA frame-
work for regulating the banking industry.o7
Another FIRREA provision, 12 U.S.C. 5 1821(d)(9), also addresses the
propriety of raising undocumented agreements against the Corporation.
That provision states that "any agreement which does not meet the require-
ments set forth in section 1823(e) of this title shall not form the basis of,
or substantially comprise, a claim against the receiver or the
Corporation."0 8  Thus, it now appears that Congress has expressly
addressed the question which D'Oench was designed to resolve.
Because a federal statute currently exists, logic dictates that the statute
not only controls the issue but also displaces any analogous common law
rule. Many of the federal courts, however, fail to acknowledge the afore-
mentioned point and continue to use the federal common law D'Oench
doctrine in cases where the statute should apply. Whether or not § 1823(e)
codifies D'Oencb is subject to differing opinions,1o9 and some courts view
the common law doctrine as a sort of protective "safety net" for the FDIC.220
The Supreme Court, however, has identified the purposes of 5 1823(e),'"
and after reviewing those purposes, one can easily conclude that the
statute was intended to serve the same function as the rule in D'Oench.
Section 1823(e) and the Influence of D'Oench. Section 1823(e) is
both broader and narrower than the D'Oencb doctrine. As one court
i" Id. at 468-69.
16 See supra note 13 (reciting text and legislative history of S 1823(e)).
107 Id.
108 12 U.S.C. 5 1821(d)(9)(A) (1994).
'0 Indeed, even within the same court, cases suggest different answers to the codification question. The
Ninth Circuit, for example, has provided conflicting responses to the query. Compare Brookside Associates
v. Rifkin, 49 F.3d 490, 493 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Congress codified the policy embodied in the D'Oench, Dubme
holding in 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) ... ") and RTCv. Alidwest Financial Savings Bank ofMinot, 36 F3d 785, 797
(1993) (discussing "D'Oench, Duhme Doctrine [sic], codified at 12 U.S.C. 5 1823(e)") with Murphy v. FDIC,
12 F.3d 1485, 1487 (9th Cir. 1993) (describing S 1823(e) as a "partial codification" of the D'Oench rule).
tio See E.I du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FDIC, 32 F.3d 592, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("[Section] 1823(e) and
1821(d)(9)(A) are Congress's attempts to codify, at least in part, the policy represented by D'Oench, but
D'Oench remains to cover situations which fall through the cracks.") (quoting In reNBW Commercial Paper
Litigation, 826 F. Supp. 1448, 1466 (D.D.C. 1992)).
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explained:
It is broader in that the statute makes the fault of the party assert-
ing the unwritten agreement irrelevant, whereas the common law
doctrine is based upon the concept of equitable estoppel; non-
fault may be asserted as a defense. It is narrower, however, in that
most courts have read the statute as applicable only to cases
involving a specific asset, usually a loan, which in the ordinary
course of business would be recorded and approved by the bank's
loan committee or board of directors.'12
Thus, the statute broadens the scope of the original doctrine by apply-
ing the prohibition to any undocumented agreement regardless of the
intentions of the parties, yet retains the spirit and purpose of the common
law rule by seeking to protect the FDIC only from agreements that tend to
put it at a disadvantage.
The Supreme Court tacitly acknowledged this retention of the spirit
and purpose of D'Oench in Langley v. FDIO by identifying two purposes
of § 1823(e). According to the Court, the first purpose of the statute "is to
allow federal and state bank examiner's to rely on a bank's records in eval-
uating the worth of the bank's assets."1 14 The second purpose of the statute
is to "ensure mature consideration of unusual loan transactions by senior
bank officials, and prevent fraudulent insertion of new terms, with collu-
sion of bank employees, when a bank appears headed for failure.""'
These two purposes-aiding reliance on bank records and protecting the
Corporation from fraud and misrepresentation-appear almost identical to
the purposes of the common law rule as articulated in D'Oench itself."'
The requirements of 5 1823(e) fall roughly into three divisions: (1)
there must be an "agreement;""7 (2) the agreement must "tend to diminish
or defeat the interest of the Corporation in any asset acquired by it" under
FIRREA; and (3) the FDIC must have notice of the agreement."8 Each of
these three requirements finds support in the D'Oench decision, demon-
.. Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 91-92 (1987).
112 du Pont, 32 F.2d at 597 (citations omitted).
"3 484 U.S. 86 (1987).
114 Id. at 91.
"I Id. at 92.
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strating the influence of D'Oench on the statute. The statutory requirement
that there be an agreement resembles D'Oencb's bar on the use of "secret
agreements,"119 and the statute's second requirement reflects the facts of
D'Oench by mandating that the agreement affect the FDIC's interest in an
asset of the failed bank.120
The third requirement of § 1823-that the FDIC have notice of any
agreement that forms the basis of a claim or defense against it-similarly
reflects the spirit of the D'Oench decision by providing a mechanism
through which the Corporation may protect itself from reliance on mis-
leading records. To meet the notice requirement an agreement must: (1)
be in writing; (2) be contemporaneous with the bank's acquisition of the
asset; (3) be approved by the bank's loan committee or board of directors;
and (4) be continuously present in the official records of the bank.121 While
protecting the FDIC in the spirit of D'Oench, these requirements simulta-
neously extend the protection afforded by the D'Oencb rule by mandating
that an agreement specifically satisfy all four conditions and by ignoring
equitable considerations such as the culpability and sophistication of the
parties involved.112 Even so, the influence of the D'Oench decision on the
statutory framework remains evident.123
Application of § 1823(e) and D'Oench. Despite the apparent influ-
ence D'Oench had on the enactment of 5 1823(e), the federal courts con-
tinued to apply the common law rule after the codification of the statute,
viewing 5 1823(e) and the D'Oench doctrine as separate lines of authori-
116 See DOench, Dubme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 459 (1942) (recognizing federal policy to protect FDIC
from misrepresentations as to genuineness of records of insured banks).
"1 The term "agreement," for purposes of 5 1823(e), received a broad construction from the Langley Court.
The Court held that the spirit of DOench covered more than express promises and that a warranty or con-
dition to payment sufficed as an "agreement" under the statute. Langley, 484 U.S. at 92-93. This reason-
ing shows that the statue was based on the D'Oench decision, a fact that bolsters the argument that 5
1823(e) codified the DOench rule.
Its For the text of § 1823(e), see supra note 13. For an overview of the statute's history, construction, and
relation to other banking provisions, see Gray, supra note 86, at 250-71.
'9 D Oench, Duhme & Co., 315 U.S. at 461.
In See id. at 454 (observing that note was designed to facilitate misrepresentation of bank's assets eventu-
ally acquired by FDIC).
121 12 U.S.C. 1823(e)(1)(A)-(D) (1994).
122 Cf Langley, 484 U.S. at 94 (stating that Langleys' argument-that statute should not apply because FDIC
had knowledge of failed bank's fraudulent actions-questionably asked the Court to "engraft an equitable
exception upon the plain terms of the statute."). But see Floyd, supra note 39, at 346 (arguing that the
Court's "apparent comfort" with its decision intimates "an implicit belief that the Langleys were not inno-
cent victims of the bank's fraud.").
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ty. 124 Apparently not wanting to be confined to the textual requirements of
the statute, the courts often use the D'Oench doctrine to aid the FDIC in
situations where the statute would not.2 5 By retaining the D'Oench rule as
an independent rule of decision, the courts have provided the FDIC with
two weapons to use in failed bank litigation instead of just one, adapting
the federal common law rule to fit situations where the plain text of the
statute will not allow it to apply.
While the common law rule, like the statute, still requires the existence
of an undocumented agreement,12 6 unlike § 1823(e), the D'Oencb rule can
bar agreements relating to liabilities of the failed bank.127 The statute, as
noted, limits the prohibition to agreements "tend[ing] to diminish...any
asset."2 The common law rule also applies to bar an agreement even
where the FDIC has notice.'2 Recall that the statute allows the use of an
agreement as long as it meets the heightened notice requirements of 5
1823(e): (1) writing; (2) contemporaneous acquisition; (3) authoritative
approval; and (4) continuous documentation.co Thus, the D'Oench rule
and § 1823(e) often lead to different results.31
In sum, § 1823(e) somewhat alters the scope and applicability of
the D'Oench doctrine, yet retains the purposes of the common law rule
and directly addresses the issue to which the original rule spoke. Despite
this apparent codification of the doctrine, however, many federal courts
continue to treat the common law rule as independent authority and apply
it to circumstances not covered by the statute. In doing so, these courts
ignore the interstitial nature that federal courts play in our system of gov-
123 It is worth mentioning here that justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Langley, referred to D'Oench
as "the leading case in this area prior to the enactment of 5 1823(e) in 1950." Langley, 484 U.S. at 92. Such
a reference suggests that Justice Scalia did not view D'Oencb as an authority under which the present case
could be decided, but considered it merely an outdated common law rule that influenced, but did not sur-
vive, the enactment of S 1823(e).
124 E.g., Young v. FDIC, 103 F.3d 1180, 1187 (4th Cir. 1997) ("[Tlhe common-law doctrine and the statute
remain separate and independent grounds for decision.")
125 See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FDIC, 32 F.3d 592, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (describing common law
D'Oench rule as "safety net" for FDIC to cover situations not covered by S 1823(e)).
126 Hanson v. FDIC, 13 F.3d 1247, 1251 (8th Cit. 1994).
127 See Young, 103 F.3d at 1189 (stating that purposes of D'Oench do not support finding that common law
rule is limited to barring only agreements affecting specific assets of failed bank).
128 12 U.S.C. S 1823(e)(1) (1994).
'2 First State Bank v. City & County Bank, 872 F.2d 707, 717 (6th Cir 1994).
IN3 12 U.S.C. S 1823(e)(1)(A)-(D) (1994).
i3i Compare Young, 103 F 3d at 1187-89 (applying D'Oench to bar claims against FDIC based on undocu-
mented letter of credit) with Murphy v. FDIC, 38 F3d 1490, 1500-01 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding letter of cred-
it not barred by S 1823(e) because letter constituted liability and not asset).
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ernment 32 and overlook the fact that "[flederal common law is a 'necessary
expedient,' and when Congress addresses a question previously governed
by decision rested on federal common law the need for such an unusual
exercise of lawmaking by federal courts disappears."133
THE PROPRIETY OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW
As noted in Part II, the D'Oencb decision provided a federal common
law rule which defined the rights and powers of the FDIC as holder of
commercial paper acquired from failed banks. 13 The absence of a federal
legislative answer to the question presented in the D'Oench case provided
the impetus for the Supreme Court's creation of federal common law.3
Since the Court's decision in D'Oencb, Congress has provided a statutory
framework designed to address the enforceability of undocumented agree-
ments against the FDIC and has consistently maintained that framework for
almost half a century.3 Despite the existence of §5 1823(e) and 1821(d)(9),
however, the federal courts have continued to use the D'Oench rule, ignor-
ing the fact that the lawmaking power of the federal judiciary is subordi-
nate to that of Congress.13 7
Recent developments, however, suggest that the federal bench is
beginning to recognize that the D'Oencb common law rule no longer con-
stitutes valid authority. The Supreme Court has handed down two deci-
sions this decade that strongly imply FIRREA remains the only source of
federal law governing the FDIC in its role as insurer and receiver, thereby
foreclosing the use of any federal common law doctrines that purport to
address circumstances involving the FDIC's rights and obligations.38
Accordingly, two federal circuit courts of appeals have expressly held that
132 See U.S. Const. art. 111, § 2 (limiting the power of the federal judiciary to specific cases and controver-
sies).
133 City ofMilwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314 (1981) (citation omitted).
134 D'Oench, Dubme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 460-62 (1942).
135 Id. at 468 (Jackson, J., concurring).
136 See supra note 13 (discussing legislative history of S 1823(e)).
137 See City ofMilwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981) ("We have always recognized that federal com-
mon law is 'subject to the paramount authority of Congress.") (quoting New jersey v. A'ew York, 283 U.S.
336, 348 (1931)); D'Oench, Dubme & Co., 315 U.S. at 472 (recognizing that lawmaking power of federal
courts exists within limits of Constitution and federal statutes).
i-, Atherton v. FDIC, 117 S. Ct.. 666, 674 (1997); OMelveny &Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1994).
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FIRREA preempts the use of D'Oench.39 Two other circuits, however, have
held fast to the federal common law doctrine, finding that FIRREA does not
preempt D'Oench. 40
The resolution of the preemption issue has significant consequences
for failed bank litigation because the nonviability of the common law rule
would confine the FDIC to the often narrower application of 5 1823(e).141
Such a result could potentially lead to increased depletion of the FDIC's
funds by preventing the collection of certain assets because of, or requir-
ing the FDIC to pay claims on, agreements heretofore barred by D'Oench.
This Part therefore reviews the Supreme Court's guidelines for determining
when a federal statute preempts federal common law, and looks at the
implications of the Court's O'Melveny and Atberton decisions on federal
common law in the area of banking regulation. This Part also examines
the current circuit split concerning the statutory preemption of the
D'Oench doctrine.
Relevant Supreme Court Decisions
A basic characteristic of the federal government is that Congress pos-
sesses the primary lawmaking power,142 and the federal courts exercise
only limited ability to create law.43 Thus, when Congress speaks to an
issue, its statement prevails over any existing federal common law rules. 144
In addition to articulating certain standards for determining when Congress
has spoken directly to an issue, the Supreme Court has also indicated its
reluctance to apply federal common law in the area of banking regulation.
A discussion of the Court's relevant federal common law jurisprudence fol-
lows.
3 DiVall insured Income Fund Ltd. Partnership v. Boatmen s First Natl Bank, 69 F.3d 1398, 1402-03 (8th
Cir. 1995); Murphy v. FDIC, 61 F.3d 34, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
140 Motorcity ofJacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, NA., 120 F3d 1140, 1144 (11th Cit. 1997); Young v.
FDIC, 103 F.3d 1180, 1187 (4th Cir. 1997).
'4 See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing differences in application of D Oench and 5 1823(e)).
"2 See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States...").
143 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
144 19 Charles Alan Wright, et al, Federal Practice and Procedure S 4514, at 454-55 (1996).
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City of Milwaukee v. Illinois. The seminal case regarding statutory
preemption of existing federal common law remains City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois'11 where the Court explained the proper analysis for determining
whether a federal statute governs an issue previously subject to federal
common law.1'6 The issue before the Court in Milwaukee concerned the
continued validity of a federal common law rule allowing abatement for
public nuisance caused by interstate water pollution after the enactment of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 197214
("Amendments").1a The Court held that the Amendments evinced a con-
gressional intent to displace the existing common law rule, and therefore,
the common law rule was preempted and no longer represented valid
authority."'9
The test set forth in Milwaukee "was whether the legislative scheme
,spoke directly to a question' [previously governed by a federal common
law]. .. not whether Congress had affirmatively proscribed the use of fed-
eral common law."150 Noting that federal common law is justified "in a 'few
and restricted' instances,"151 the Court nonetheless "recognized that federal
common law is 'subject to the paramount authority of Congress.""52
Congress exercised its paramount authority by enacting the Amendments,
which constituted a comprehensive scheme for controlling and abating
water pollution. 5 As such, the statute left no room for the existing feder-
al common law rule.154 In other words, even though Congress had not
expressly forbidden the use of federal common law, it had created a com-
prehensive scheme that so occupied the water pollution field as to fore-
15 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
14 Id. at 310-17.
'7 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.).
* Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 310.
" Id. at 317-19.
'5 Id. at 315.
"' Id. at 313 (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963)).
152 Id. (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 348 (1931)).
1" Id. at 318-19.
1" See id. at 319-32 (addressing the particular claims involved in Milwaukee and concluding that "no fed-
eral common-law remedy was available").
236
THE COURT GIVETH, AND CONGRESS TAKETH AWAY
close the application of any other source of federal law.' Therefore, the
earlier common law rule no longer had any impact on the rights of the par-
ties before the Court.
United States v. Texas. The Supreme Court reiterated the standard
of Milwaukee in United States v. Texas,156 the Court's most recent decision
concerning statutory preemption of federal common law. In Texas, the
Court held that Congress had not intended the Debt Collection Act of
1982157 to abrogate the government's federal common law right to collect
prejudgment interest on debts owed to it by the states."8 While acknowl-
edging that Milwaukee does not require Congress to affirmatively proscribe
common law doctrines in order to preempt them, the Court noted that
"Congress does not write upon a clean slate.""'> The Court explained that
statutes are interpreted with a presumption that well-established common
law principles were intended to be retained, although a statutory purpose
to the contrary defeats that presumption.60 Referring to Milwaukee, the
Court stated that "[i]n order to abrogate a common-law principle, the
statute must 'speak directly' to the question addressed by the common
law."'6 Thus, Texas retained Milwaukee's "speak directly" standard while
simultaneously providing that federal statutes should be presumed not to
abrogate existing common law rules without some indication that they are
intended to do so.
Together, Milwaukee and Texas furnish guidelines for determining
whether a federal legislative scheme preempts an existing federal common
law doctrine. First, a presumption exists that Congress has legislated with
an expectation that the common law rule will be retained.t62 This pre-
sumption can be overcome, however, when there exists a statutory pur-
pose to the contrary.6 3 Moreover, a comprehensive, all-encompassing leg-
' See id. at 318-19 ("Congress' intent in enacting the Amendments was clearly to establish an all-encom-
passing program of water pollution regulation .... The establishment of such a self-consciously comprehen-
sive program by Congress ... strongly suggests that there is no room for courts to attempt to improve on
that program with federal common law.").
'5 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993).
'5 Pub. L. No. 97365, 96 Stat. 1749 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.).
' Texas, 507 U.S. at 530.
19 Id. at 534.
i5 Id.
61 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
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islative scheme that regulates an area of law in its entirety strongly suggests
that Congress intended to preempt any collateral sources of federal law.1
Finally, when Congress speaks directly to an issue previously governed by
a federal common law rule, that common law rule is preempted.165 A deci-
sion handed down by the Court in 1994, O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC,166
found FIRREA to be comprehensive legislation, thus suggesting that
Congress intended to preempt federal common law rules which addressed
issues of bank regulation.
O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC The primary issue before the Court in
O'Melveny concerned whether state law or federal common law deter-
mined whether the knowledge of corporate officers of a failed savings and
loan ("S & L") that the institution's assets were fraudulently overvalued
could be imputed to the S & L itself in a tort action.167 Concluding that state
law governed the issue, the Court explained that FIRREA "specifically cre-
ated special federal rules of decision regarding claims by, and defenses
against, the FDIC as receiver."''6 Because the statute did not address the
imputation of liability issue, state law provided the applicable rule of deci-
sion.l69
Although OMelveny can be read simply as a choice of law decision,
its reasoning has great significance in determining the role of federal com-
mon law in the area of banking regulation. The Court recognized that in
deciding the issue before it, it could not "contradict an explicit federal
statutory provision."170 Likewise, the Court could not "adopt a court-made
rule to supplement federal statutory regulation that is comprehensive and
detailed."171 The Court further identified FIRREA as a "comprehensive"
statutory regulation of the banking industryl72 which created an exclusive
grant of rights to the FDIC.173 As the majority opinion stated:
164 City ofMilwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 319 (1981).
165 Id. at 315.
'6 512 U.S. 79, 85 (1994).
167 Id. at 84-85.
'6 Id. at 86.
'6 Id. at 86-87.
170 Id. at 85.
1'7 Id.
172 Id. at 85-86.
173 Id. at 86.
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It is hard to avoid the conclusion that [the statute] places the FDIC
in the shoes of the insolvent S & L, to work out its claims under
state law, except where some provision in the extensive frame-
work of FIRREA provides otherwise. To create additional "feder-
al common-law" exceptions is not to "supplement" this scheme,
but to alter it.174
Although the Court addressed outright only the propriety of creating
(rather than retaining) federal common law, the O'Melveny decision
implied that FIRREA constituted the only source of federal law concerning
the rights of the FDIC in failed bank litigation. Thus, the statute rendered
invalid any other sources of federal law purporting to do the same.
Moreover, the Court specifically mentioned § 1821(d)(9), one of the statu-
tory provisions codifying the D'Oencb rule, in its list of those exclusive
rights granted to the Corporation by FIRREA.1  Consequently, O'Melveny
implicates not just federal common law, but the D'Oench doctrine itself.
Atherton v. FDIC In early 1997, the Supreme Court handed down
another ruling which, like O'Melveny, demonstrated that FIRREA supplied
the sole source of federal law regarding the position of the FDIC in failed
bank litigation.1 6 The primary issue before the Court in Atherton con-
cerned the legal standard for determining whether the behavior of corpo-
rate officers of a federally chartered and insured financial institution was
improper.17 In deciding this issue, the Court held that state law sets the
standard of conduct as long as the state standard remains stricter than that
of FIRREA.s17 More importantly for D'Oench analysis, the Court refused to
recognize or create a federal common law rule to deal with the issue.'7 9
The Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC"), as receiver for the failed
institution, s initiated the action against officers and directors of the bank,
alleging gross negligence, simple negligence, and breach of fiduciary
17 Id. at 86-87.
us Id. at 86.
76 Atherton v. FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 666 (1997).
in Id. at 669.
17 Id.
"' Id. at 674.
'8 The FDIC replaced the RTC as receiver pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 5 1441a(b)(4)(A) (1994).
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duty.lal The defendants argued that 12 U.S.C. 5 1821(k)182 authorized
actions for gross negligence or more seriously culpable conduct, and there-
fore all claims but those of gross negligence should be dismissed.83 The
district court agreed, but the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the statute
did not prohibit negligence or breach of duty claims available to the receiv-
er as a matter of federal common law.86
The Supreme Court vacated the Third Circuit decision, stating that
"[t]here is no federal common law that would create a general standard of
care applicable to this case."15  While Atherton focuses more on federal
preemption of state law than on congressional preemption of federal com-
mon law, the Court's reluctance to fashion a federal common law rule bol-
sters the implication of 0 Melveny that Congress intended FIRREA to be the
singular source of federal law governing the FDIC. 186
Circuit Split Over Statutory Preemption of D'Oench Doctrine
The OMelveny and Atherton decisions prompted several federal courts
to reconsider the relationship between FIRREA and the common law
D'Oench rule. The District of Columbia Circuit became the first federal
Court of Appeals to appraise O'Melvenys impact on the continued validi-
ty of the D'Oench doctrine, concluding that OMelveny compelled a find-
ing that FIRREA preempted the federal common law rule.87 Not long after
the that ruling, the Eighth Circuit similarly determined that O'Melveny
removed D'Oench as an independent ground for decision." Other courts
have likewise concluded that O'Melveny and Atherton significantly affect
"8' Atherton, 117 S. Ct. at 669.
182 The statute provides that officers of a federally insured bank may be held personally responsible for
damages resulting from gross negligence or similar conduct demonstrating a greater disregard of duty than
gross negligence. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (1994).
183 Atherton, 117 S. Ct. at 669.
184 Id.
1" Id. at 674.
186 Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized Atherton's significance for the continued validity of the D'Oench
doctrine. The Court granted certiorari in the Motorcity case, discussed infra notes 213-221 and accompa-
nying text, which held that FIRREA did not preempt the D Oench common law rule. Motorcity of
Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 83 F.3d 1317, 1345 (11th Cir 1996) (en banc). The Court subse-
quently vacated the judgment and remanded the case for consideration in light of Atherton. Hess v. FDIC,
117 S. Ct. 760 (1997).
187 Murphy v. FDIC, 61 F.3d 34, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
188 DiVall Insured Income Fund Ltd. Partnership v. Boatmen's First Nat? Bank, 69 F.3d 1398, 1402-03 (8th
Cir. 1995).
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the applicability of the federal common law rule, although none has
expressly held D'Oench to be preempted by FIRREA.15 9
Some courts, however, have continued to use D'Oencb as a separate
line of authority after O'Melveny and Atherton, refusing to find the com-
mon law doctrine preempted by congressional action. The Eleventh
Circuit, for example, concluded O'Melveny did nothing to change the rela-
tionship between FIRREA and D'Oench.i9 The Supreme Court subse-
quently remanded the case for consideration in light of Atherton, and the
Eleventh Circuit again found that D'Oench constituted valid authority.t
The Fourth Circuit recently agreed with the Eleventh Circuit, stating simply
that "[slection 1823(e) does not...preempt the D'Oench doctrine."l92
As mentioned earlier, the resolution of this split in the circuits could
have great importance for the rights of the FDIC, as well as the rights of
innocent borrowers, when litigating obligations in the aftermath of bank
failures. If the common law D'Oench doctrine no longer represents good
law, the Corporation will be forced to structure its arguments within the
confines of § 1823(e), probably resulting in more rulings for borrowers and
less money in the FDIC's coffers. To enable the reader to understand the
dynamics of the circuit split over preemption, a brief discussion of the
leading cases for each side follows.
Murphy. Not long after the Supreme Court's decision in OMelveny,
the District of Columbia Circuit held that the reasoning of that decision
decided the question whether FIRREA's comprehensive scheme preempt-
ed the federal common law D'Oench doctrine.>9 The plaintiff in Murphy
brought suit against the FDIC as receiver for a failed bank that allegedly
" See FDIC v. Craft, No. 93-35138, 1998 WL 656169, at *7 (9th Cir. Sept.25, 1998) (concluding that D Oench
does not apply when FDIC acts as receiver); Ledo Financial Corp. v. Summers, 122 F.3d 825, 828-29 (9th
Cir. 1997) (finding that OMelveny and Atherton rendered D'Oencb inapplicable because no sufficient fed-
eral interest existed to justify use of federal common law); Dimuzio v. RTC, 68 F.3d 777, 780 n.2 (3d Cir
1995) ("We note that the DOench, Dubme doctrine may no longer be a separate bar to plaintiffs claims.")
(citing O'Melveny); FDIC v. Parkway Erecutive Office Center No. CIVA. 96-121, 1997 WL 535164, at * 15
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 1997) (noting that Atherton "reenforces and strengthens the legal precepts articulated in
O'Melveny with respect to the diminishing significance of federal common law in the FIRREA context") (not
reported).
190 Motorcity offacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, NA., 83 F.3d 1317, 1327-34 (11th Cir. 1996) (Motorcity
0.
19' Motorcity of jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 120 F.2d 1140, 1143 (11th Cir. 1997) (Motorcity
192 Young v. FDIC, 103 F.3d 1180, 1187 (4th Cir 1997).
'3 Murphy v. FDIC, 61 F.3d 34, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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had entered into a real estate venture with the plaintiff as a joint investor.194
The bank had also loaned Murphy approximately $50 million for financing
the venture.19 5 Alleging among other things that the bank was both negli-
gent and fraudulent in its role as Murphy's partner, Murphy pointed to no
written agreement supporting the existence of a joint venture., Indeed,
the loan agreements contained the following provision: "The Lender is a
lender only and shall not be considered a shareholder, joint venturer or
partner of the Borrower."97 Accordingly, the district court barred Murphy's
claims under both the D'Oench doctrine and 5 1823(e).198
The District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's decision,
first noting that § 1823(e) did not bar the plaintiffs suit because that statute
applies only to cases involving a specific asset, usually a loan, which meets
the approval of the bank's loan committee.9 9 The court also noted that the
terms of the statue "'effectively limit that provision to conventional loan
transactions. "'200 Because Murphy did not try to avoid paying off the loan,
and because the FDIC could point to no specific asset that would be dimin-
ished by Murphy's claims, the court held that § 1823(e) did not apply.201
Moving to the federal common law issue, the court determined that the
FDIC likewise could not rely on the D'Oench doctrine to bar Murphy's
claims because O'Melveny indicated that Congress had intended to pre-
empt the D'Oench rule.202 Recognizing that Supreme Court decisions
should be given a broad reading rather than one limiting them to the par-
ticular facts,203 the court reasoned:
That point has particular force in this instance, for while the vital-
ity of D'Oench was not directly at issue in O'Melveny & Myers, the
Court was specifically advised by both sides on brief and at oral
argument that resolution of the issue before it could also affect the
'94 Id. at 35.
195 Id.
'96 Id. at 36.
197 Id.
198 Id.
* Id. at 37.
20 Id. (quoting F.l du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FDIC, 32 F3d 592, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
20t Id. at 37-38. The court determined that the Corporation's failure to effectively address the asset require-
ment "amountled] to a near concession that the statute does not bar Murphy's claims and that if the FDIC
is to find any refuge it must be in federal common law." Id.
202 Id. at 40.
203 Id. at 39.
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D'Oench doctrine. Moreover, although the opinion for the Court
does not specifically mention D'Oench, it does expressly include
one of the D'Oench-like statutory provisions...in the list of special
federal statutory rules of decision....In so doing the Supreme
Court, we think, necessarily decided the D'Oench question. To
translate: the inclusion of § 1821(d)(9) in the FIRREA implies the
exclusion of overlapping federal common law defenses not specif-
ically mentioned in the statue-of which the D'Oench doctrine is
one.20 4
Accordingly, the FDIC could not use the D'Oench rule to bar Murphy's
claims against it, and the case was remanded to the district court for fur-
ther proceedings.205
DiVaiL Relying on Murphy, the Eighth Circuit also decided that
O'Melveny required a finding that FIRREA preempted D'Oencb.206 The
plaintiff in DiVall had executed a promissory note for $600,000 payable to
Metro North State Bank, which subsequently entered receivership under
the FDIC. 20 7 Boatmen's First National Bank of Kansas City ("Boatmen's")
acquired the note in a purchase and assumption transaction and demand-
ed payment; the plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action asserting that
it was not liable on the note due to lack of consideration.208 The district
court ruled that Boatmen's qualified as a holder in due course under the
federal HDC doctrine and therefore was entitled to summary judgment in
its favor.209
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court decision, finding that any
federal bar to the plaintiffs lack of consideration defense had to originate
in a specific provision of FIRREA.2 10 In the words of the court:
O'Melveny states that federal courts may not invoke federal com-
mon law to "supplement" the specific exceptions provided by FIR-
204 Id.
205 Id. at 41.
206 DiVall Insured Income Fund Ltd. Partnership v. Boatmen's First A'at Bank, 69 F.3d 1398, 1402-03 (8th
Cir 1995).
207 Id at 1399-1400.
208 Id. at 1400.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 1402-03.
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REA. When Congress enacted the comprehensive framework of
FIRREA, it preempted the federal common law rules that restrict-
ed the claims and defenses which parties could raise against the
FDIC. Accordingly, we hold that OMelveny removes the federal
common law D'Oench, Dubme doctrine and the federal holder in
due course doctrine as separate bars to DiVall's defense. If DiVall's
defense is to be barred, it must be barred either by a specific pro-
vision of FIRREA or by state law.211
Because the plaintiff did not rely on an agreement that was prohibited by
§ 1823(e) or Missouri law, the lack of consideration defense survived sum-
mary judgment. 2 12
Motorcity. While the courts in Murphy and DiVall found the D'Oench
doctrine preempted by FIRREA based on the reasoning of the O'Melveny
decision, the Eleventh Circuit reached quite the opposite result in Motorcity
ofjacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, N.A.2 13 Disagreeing with the Murphy
and DiVallcourts, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's Texas
analysis,214 concluding that, despite FIRREA's comprehensive statutory
scheme, the statute evinced no intent on the part of Congress to abrogate
the D'Oench rule.215 The court distinguished OMelveny, emphasizing that
the Supreme Court never specifically addressed the validity of D'Oencb in
that case and stating that the question in O'Melveny "was whether the fed-
eral courts should create new federal common-law doctrine in an area in
which Congress had not expressed any special concern."2 16 In the present
case, the court noted, the question was whether Congress intended to pre-
empt an existing federal common law rule.217 As noted, the court answered
that question in the negative.
Following the Eleventh Circuit's Motorcity I ruling, the Supreme Court
211 Id. (citations omitted).
212 Id. at 1404.
2138 3 F.3d 1317, 1327-34 (11th Cir. 1996)(en banc) (Motorcity 1).
214 See United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (recognizing presumption exists for retention of well-
established common law rules unless Congress evinces purpose to the contrary); see also supra Part llI.A.2
(discussing Texas decision).
215 Motorcity l, 83 F.3d at 1330-34.
216 Id. at 1330.
217 Id.
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granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for con-
sideration in light of the Atherton decision.218 On remand, however, the
Eleventh Circuit stuck to its guns, finding that Atherton, like OMelveny,
focused on whether to create new federal common law and not whether
an existing federal common law doctrine should be retained.219 The
Atherton decision, according to the court, simply did not control the issue
at hand, and nothing in the Supreme Court's opinion in that case com-
pelled a result different from that of the Eleventh Circuit's earlier deci-
sion.2 2 0 Again relying on Texas, the court concluded that D'Oench was not
preempted by FIRREA and therefore remained good law.221
Young. The Eleventh Circuit's position-that FIRREA did not preempt
the D'Oench doctrine-found approval by the Fourth Circuit in Young v.
FDIC.2 22 The case involved a complicated series of transactions that were
intended ultimately to secure $600 million to finance Young's oil and gas
investments.2 2 3 Young brought several claims against those involved in the
financing arrangement, including an institution that eventually went into
receivership under the FDIC.224
Young's claims against the FDIC primarily concerned a letter of credit
designed to secure one of the loans made to Young.22 5 Because the bank's
records did not contain the letter of credit, however, the court concluded
that the D'Oench doctrine prohibited any claims based on the letter.226 The
court recognized that § 1823(e) might not bar Young's claims against the
Corporation because the letter of credit represented a liability of the failed
bank rather than an asset.?7 Nonetheless, the court determined it did not
need to reach the asset limitation issue because there was no such limita-
tion on the common law rule228 and § 1823(e) did not preempt D'Oench.229
Because D'Oench remained valid authority, the doctrine barred Young's
218 Hess v FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 760 (1997).
219 Motorcity Ofjacksonville, Ltd, v. Southeast Bank, NA., 120 F.3d 1140, 1143 (11th Cir. 1997) (Motorcity
220 Id. at 1144.
221 Id.
222 103 F.3d 1180 (4th Cir. 1997).
223 Id. at 1183-86.
224 Id. at 1185 n.3.
25 Id. at 1186.
226 Id. at 1187-89.
227 Id. at 1188-89.
228 Id. at 1189.
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claims, and the court never reached the issue of whether or not 5 1823(e)
would apply.
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER
The current circuit split concerning the statutory preemption of
D'Oench leaves unresolved a question of great consequence to future
failed bank litigation. If the FDIC can no longer rely on the common law
rule, then its position in regard to borrowers of the insolvent institutions it
regulates will be minimized by the strictures of § 1823(e)'s statutory lan-
guage. As the decisions in Murphy and DiVall indicate, the statute has very
specific requirements that, if unmet, will not trigger the statute's protec-
tion.2 30 The statutory requirements, as the FDIC has recently discovered,
cut both ways. If the borrower cannot meet the notice requirements of 5
1823(e)(A)-(D), then he cannot raise a claim or defense against the FDIC
based on the insufficiently documented agreement. On the other hand, if
the FDIC cannot show that the borrower's claim or defense rests on an
agreement which affects a specific asset of the failed bank, usually a loan
agreement, then the Corporation will likely not be able to prohibit that
agreement from being raised. Because the D'Oench doctrine generally
provides the FDIC with broader protection, the resolution of the statutory
preemption question remains very important to the Corporation's rights
and powers under federal law.
This Part analyzes the statutory preemption issue, drawing upon the
guidelines advanced by the Supreme Court in Milwaukee and Texas, as
well as the Court's implication of the propriety of federal common law in
the FIRREA context from O'Melveny and Atherton. Concluding that the rea-
soning of Murphy and DiVall present the better approach in resolving the
issue than do Motorcity and Young, this Part presents two reasons why
D'Oench should be considered preempted by %§ 1823(e) and 1821(d)(9)and
should therefore no longer be relied on by the courts. First, FIRREA
evinces a legislative purpose to preempt the D'Oench doctrine, thus over-
coming the presumption that common law doctrines should be retained
229 Id. at 1187
230 See supra Part ILB (discussing statutory requirements and differences in application of statute and com-
mon law rule).
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after the enactment of a statute. Second, FIRREA codifies the D'Oench
holding and speaks directly to the same issue as the common law rule.
FIRREA Evinces Statutory Purpose to Preempt D'Oench
FIRREA represents a comprehensive statutory regulation of the bank-
ing industry.2 31 As such, FIRREA strongly suggests a statutory purpose to
preempt the use of any federal common law rules.232 Indeed, the crux of
the O'Melveny decision is that FIRREA's extensive framework, which
specifically defines the rights and powers of the FDIC, forecloses the appli-
cation of any other sources of federal law, including the D'Oench doc-
trine.2 33 Congress apparently wanted FIRREA to be the last word regarding
the FDIC's position under federal law, and any federal common law excep-
tions to its framework do not supplement the statue but illegitimately alter
it.234 Atherton supports this proposition, if only minimally, by refusing to
implement any federal common law rule defining the standard of care
owed by bank officers and directors.235 If a federal court finds it cannot
answer a question by looking to a specific provision of FIRREA, state law
must control the issue because no other source of federal law exists to pro-
vide an answer.2 36 Thus, the D'Oench doctrine did not survive the enact-
ment of FIRREA.
The all-encompassing nature of FIRREA's regulatory scheme provides
sufficient evidence of a congressional purpose to eliminate the presump-
tion established in Texas that federal common law rules are to be retained.
The Eleventh Circuit, however, relied on the Texas presumption in deter-
231 O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 85-86 (1994).
232 See City of Milwaukee v. illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 319 (1981) (stating that enactment by Congress of com-
prehensive program "strongly suggests that there is no room for courts to attempt to improve on that pro-
gram with federal common law").
233 See OMelveny, 512 U.S. at 86-87 (explaining that FDIC's argument that portions of FIRREA can be sup-
plemented or modified by federal common law "is demolished by those provisions ... which specifically cre-
ate special federal rules of decision" regarding FDIC's role as receiver).
234 Id. at 87; see DiVall Insured Income Fund Ltd. Partnership v. Boatmen's First Nat'l Bank, 69 F.3d 1398,
1402 (8th Cir. 1995) (reading OMelveny to prohibit federal courts from "supplementing" specific provisions
of FIRREA).
235 Atherton v. FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 666, 674 (1997).
236 Cf DiVall, 69 F.3d at 1402-03 ("If DiVall's defense is to be barred, it must be barred either by a specif-
ic provision of FIRREA or by state law.").
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mining that FIRREA did not preempt D'Oench.2 37 The Motorcity II court
itself recognized that the Texas presumption disappears when there exists
a statutory purpose to the contrary. 238 The opinion, however, did not
explicitly deal with the fact that FIRREA is comprehensive legislation,
instead citing the discussion of that point in Motorcity J.239
In Motorcity I, the court acknowledged the significance of FIRREA's
comprehensive nature, 24 0 but nevertheless concluded that such a scheme
did not show a congressional intent to preempt D'Oench because the com-
mon law rule presented no inconsistency with the primary purpose of FIR-
REA-"to strengthen the FDIC's long-established right to protect itself from
secret agreements executed by failing banks.""1 Moreover, the Motorcity I
opinion reasoned, FIRREA preserved § 1823(e) as it existed prior to FIR-
REA, thereby showing an intent to keep the common law rule and the
statute coexistent.2 42 Accordingly, the court found that the Texas presump-
tion applied and D'Oench survived FIRREA.24 3
The Motorcity I analysis overlooks two important points. First, the
O'Melveny decision shows that federal common law exceptions to FIRREA
alter its legislative scheme.24 4 Therefore, any federal common law rule that
purports to define the FDIC's rights under federal law is, as a matter of
course, inconsistent with the statute. Assuming that the Eleventh Circuit's
identification of FIRREA's purpose is correct-that Congress enacted the
statute to strengthen the FDIC's power to protect itself from secret agree-
ments-the statute nevertheless provides an extensive assortment of
weapons to accomplish that purpose.24 5 Anything not found in that arse-
nal, even something that aids the FDIC in protecting itself, conflicts with
the statutory framework. Bolstering the argument that FIRREA left no room
for judicial lawmaking are the O'Melveny and Atherton decisions. Each of
those cases arose during a banking crisis equalling, if not surpassing, that
of the Great Depression. Unlike the D'Oench Court, however, the
237 Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, NA., 120 F.3d 1140, 1143 (11th Cir. 1997) (Motorcity
HI)
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 83 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir. 1996) (Motorcity I).
241 Id. at 1332-33.
242 Id. at 1333.
243 Id. at 1333-34.
244 O'Melveny & Myers V. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994).
245 See id. at 86-87 (listing various provisions of FIRREA that aid FDIC in its role as receiver).
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O'Melveny and Atberton Courts refused to supplement the legislative
scheme constructed by Congress, even though doing so might well have
aided the federal policy of protecting the FDIC and saving taxpayer money.
Second, that the Supreme Court recognized the D'Oench rule as inde-
pendent authority after the initial enactment of § 1823(e) in 1950 is not nec-
essarily a foregone conclusion. The Court has not applied D'Oench to bar
a claim or defense since doing so in D'Oench itself, and the Court's opin-
ion in Langley v. FDIC referred to D'Oench not as the source of an applic-
able rule, but as "the leading case in this area prior to enactment of 5
1823(e)."24 6 Despite the wide-spread use of D'Oencb after 1950, this refer-
ence at least leaves open the question whether such use should be con-
sidered legitimate. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit's rationale that Congress
intended to keep the D'Oench rule coexistent with § 1823(e) because the
statute was reenacted in its pre-FIRREA form is not airtight.
O'Melveny and its progeny show that FIRREA constitutes comprehen-
sive legislation that leaves no room for federal common law rules that
define the rights and powers of the FDIC. By enacting FIRREA, Congress
revealed a statutory purpose to preempt any existing federal common law.
Therefore, the Texas presumption disappears, clearing the way for a find-
ing that Congress preempted D'Oench by speaking directly to the same
issue previously governed by the common law rule.
FIRREA Codifies D'Oench and Speaks Directly to Same Issue
The Supreme Court emphasized in both Milwaukee and Texas that
Congress can preempt federal common law by speaking directly to the
issue addressed by the common law doctrine.247 Since §§ 1823(e) and
1821(d)(9) directly address the same issue as D'Oencb-the enforceability
of undocumented agreements against the FDIC-those provisions of FIR-
REA preempt the federal common law doctrine.248 In Motorcity I, howev-
er, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the aforementioned provisions did
not speak directly to the D'Oench issue because they do not "comprehen-
sively address the substance of the federal common law" rule.29 In other
words, because % 1823(e) and 1821(d)(9) do not apply in every situation
246 484 U.S. 86, 92 (1987).
247 United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 315 (1981).
248 See supra Part I.132 (discussing statutory provisions and how they relate to D'Oencb doctrine)
249 Motorcity ofjacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, NA., 83 F3d 1317, 1332 (11th Cir. 1996).
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where the courts have found D'Oench to apply, FIRREA does not speak
directly to the D'Oench question.
The Eleventh Circuit's analysis, however, disregards that D'Oench
heavily influenced the requirements of 5 1823(e),250 and the purposes of the
statute as identified in Langley correspond to the purposes the D'Oench
Court gave for creating the common law rule in the first place.251 Thus, 5
1823(e) and 1821(d)(9) speak directly to the question that the D'Oencb
Court attempted to resolve. That the statutes do not provide as broad pro-
tection for the FDIC as the common law doctrine remains irrelevant.
Congress has identified when an undocumented agreement may form the
basis of a claim or defense against the FDIC-the very issue before the
Court in D'Oench-and therefore has preempted the D'Oench doctrine,
rendering it invalid as an independent ground for decision.
Furthermore, there currently exists no need for the D'Oench rule
because Congress has provided a rule of decision. The Eleventh Circuit's
reasoning overlooks the fact that the D'Oencb rule came to life because
Congress had not statutorily defined the rights of the FDIC in regard to it
status as holder of commercial paper acquired from insolvent institutions.252
A statutory definition of those rights now exists, eliminating the need for
the federal common law rule:
Insofar as one justification for the exercise of federal common law
is that Congress has not spoken on the matter before the court,
that justification is removed once Congress has spoken on a par-
ticular matter. Moreover, if the justification for the creation of fed-
eral common law is that it is necessary in an area of strong feder-
al concern, once Congress has legislated on the subject, its deci-
sion prevails over the judicial lawmaking since it has primary
responsibility for determining federal policy.253
250 See supra Part IIB.1 (discussing influence of D'Oench on S 1823(e)).
251 See supra notes 113-116 and accompanying text (identifying purposes of S 1823(e) as articulated in
Langley).
252 D'Oench, Dubme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 468-69 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
253 Wright, supra note 144, S 4514, at 480-81.
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CONCLUSION
The answer to the question whether FIRREA preempts the federal
common law D'Oench doctrine will significantly affect the rights and pow-
ers of the FDIC as regulator of failed financial institutions. The D'Oench
doctrine provides a broad and fluid weapon through which the
Corporation can safeguard its funds by barring virtually any agreement that
tends to place the FDIC at a disadvantage. The statute, on the other hand,
presents a more structured tool that provides hurdles over which both the
borrower and the Corporation must step. Because the common law rule
applies in a broader range of circumstances, a finding that D'Oench is pre-
empted could cost the FDIC large amounts of money.
Recognizing the federal policy of protecting the FDIC's funds, howev-
er, Congress has shown that it intends that protection to come from the
express language of FIRREA. While there exists a presumption that
Congress does not intend to abrogate existing common law rules when it
enacts legislation unless a contrary purpose appears evident, FIRREA's
comprehensive framework in the field of banking regulation shows that
Congress intended FIRREA to be the sole basis of the FDIC's rights under
federal law, thereby eliminating the use of federal common law. Moreover,
§ 1823(e) directly addresses the same issue as the D'Oencb doctrine, suffi-
ciently preempting that doctrine under the rule of Milwaukee.
Congress has spoken, and its message suggests that it no longer wants
the FDIC protected at all costs to the innocent borrower. Keeping intact
the basic requirements of the D'Oench holding, Congress has nonetheless
opted for a scheme that places the FDIC in an identical position as the
failed institution unless the statute explicitly provides otherwise, meaning
that the Corporation may be forced to pay damages for the bank's wrong-
doing or may have to ward off certain defenses that the D'Oench rule
would categorically prohibit. In doing so, however, Congress has retained
the D'Oench doctrine's basic protections. The FDIC still has enormous
power under FIRREA, a power very similar, though not quite as broad, as
that enjoyed by the Corporation under federal common law.
In determining the statutory preemption question, the courts should be
aware that the continued use of D'Oench not only affects the relationship
between the FDIC and parties to banking transactions, it also implicates
separation of powers. Congress has directly spoken to the D'Oench issue,
and as the branch of government that is charged with determining federal
251
BANKING LAW JOURNAL
policy, its word should govern. The judiciary must listen to Congress and
follow its command, and when the courts rely on their own rule of deci-
sion despite applicable legislation, they begin to overstep their constitu-
tional bounds. The continued application of federal common law despite
statutory intervention not only violates separation of powers, but consti-
tutes judicial aggrandizement of legislative power. As one of the Framers
indicated long ago: "The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if
they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the con-
sequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the
legislative body."254
254 The Federalist No. 78, at 404 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 1990)
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